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UK birth registration and its present discontents
Edward HiggsDepartment of History, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
Abstract Calls for reform of the United Kingdom (UK) birth registration system to allow it to be more flexible regarding subsequent
name changes, gender recording and to contain information about 'third parties' involved in procreation are justified and important.
However, we need to ask exactly when discussions about the birth registration system in the country became primarily about the
welfare of the individual child being registered? This was hardly the case at the system's inception in 1836, or during much of its
history. In addition, it is also interesting how far calls for reform show the extent to which those involved have internalized the norms
of the bureaucratic state – hence, people seem to feel that they have been 'living a lie' because of the gender on their birth
certificate. Also, how do we understand 'privacy' in the context of birth registration when some people are desperate to publically
proclaim their new gender status, whilst others are eager to maintain privacy with regard to their genealogy? Overall, the problems of
birth registration reflect the broader muddle of identification in the UK.
© 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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gender-identity-case/ (last accessed 18 October 2017); http://old.Two articles on the deficiencies of the United Kingdom
(UK) birth registration system, one by Crawshaw et al.
(2017) and the second by McCandless (2017), argue that
advances in procreation technologies, and social changes
such as the acceptance of civil unions and sex/gender
change, require the system to be updated. This is to allow it
to be more flexible regarding subsequent name changes,
gender recording and to contain information about ‘third
parties’ involved in procreation. McCandless, it should be
noted, is more cautious than Crawshaw et al., pointing to
the continued power of the nuclear family norm, even
amongst same-sex couples. The basic thrust of the articles
is, however, that birth registration is for the benefit of the
individual child or adult, and should operationalize their
right to be able to construct the narrative about themselves
that they desire, or to have a full understanding of the
events affecting their lives. Thus, someone who has changed.
11.001
ished by Elsevier Ltd. This is a
d/4.0/).their gender should be able to have their registration details
changed to insert a new name and gender, or, for example,
to be able to find their biological, as opposed to affective,
father. Both articles see registration as, in some sense,
constituting citizenship (Crawshaw et al.) or ‘recognition’
(McCandless) by society and the state. These issues are not
confined to the UK but are exercising individuals, legal
systems and government institutions around the world.1
I would be the first to accept that people ought to be able
to do these things, and anything I say below is a comment on
the nature of the arguments used in these articles, or the
feasibility of reform, not the validity of the ends being
sought. After all, for an historian of identification such asseylii.org/sc/judgment/supreme-court/2015/130 (last accessed 18
October 2017). The author would like to thank Bronwen Manby of
the Bhalisa network for these references.
n open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
2 Guidance GOV.UK Verify: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/introducing-govuk-verify/introducing-govuk-verify
(last accessed 19 October 2017); biometric residence permits:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introducing-govuk-
verify/introducing-govuk-verify (last accessed 19 October 2017).
36 E Higgsmyself, the complexity of parentage is a given. In the
early-modern period, for example, children could have three
or four parents – their biological progenitors and their
godparents, the latter often being of crucial importance
(Coster, 1995). In the case of premodern baptism, however,
it was not the body that was being recorded but the entry of
the soul into the Christian community. The authors of these
articles are fully cognizant of the laws relating to the
registration system, and reveal many of the ways in which
the system is out of date and fails citizens. In general terms,
ways have to be found to enable individuals to exercise their
rights in law.
There are certain aspects of the authors’ arguments that
are interesting to an historian. For example, McCandless
(2017) is quite right to ask, ‘What is the purpose of a birth
certificate?’, although it might be better to ask, ‘What is the
purpose of the registration system – both in terms of the
certificate and the data system that lies behind it?’. But we
need to ask exactly when discussions about the birth
registration system in the UK became primarily about the
welfare of the child being registered? This was hardly the
case at the system’s inception in 1836, or during much of its
history. The primary motive for the establishment of
registration in the UK (or at least England and Wales, since
Scotland only followed suit in 1855) was, I think, to establish
property rights by descent more accurately, but this did not
necessarily help the newborn – if they were illegitimate,
they could not inherit, or the date of their birth might
exclude them from inheriting an estate if, for example, it
was entailed on the eldest male offspring amongst a group of
brothers. The ability of non-conformists to avoid having to
be married or baptize their children in the Church of
England was a boon to the parents, not to the child. The
ability to prove one’s age for the purposes of getting a job,
or an Old Age Pension from 1911, hardly helped individuals
when it prevented them from getting work (and this was
resented by many working-class families), or it prevented
the poor from getting pensions until they reached 70 years
of age (which many, of course, did not). We might see all
this as improving welfare, but of society, rather than of
individuals in the first respect. Much the same could be said,
of course, of the creation of medical and demographic
statistics – they helped to improve the lot of society, not
that of the individual directly. After all, even a child who
died was registered (Higgs, 2004). Indeed, those who
ascribe to the ideas of Michel Foucault, the French historian
of ideas and philosopher, might see birth registration as
being for the purposes of the state in understanding the
extent of its ‘bio-power’ for geopolitical ends (Foucault,
1982, 1991). So, are the authors trying to use a bureaucratic
system for ends for which it is radically unprepared? Perhaps
so, but that should not stop us from thinking through
alternatives.
There is also the implication in these articles that birth
registration is, in some sense, about citizenship or official
‘recognition’. A birth certificate is certainly one of the
‘feeder documents’ that underpin this in many countries,
especially in those influenced by the French civil code. But
how far is it the case in the UK? The current British identity
regime seems to be stressing the need for networks of
supporting documents/contacts, as in the Verify system, for
British citizens, or biometric permits for those withoutBritish nationality.2 This is a very old pattern in the case of
England that goes back, in one form or other, for centuries
(Higgs, 2011). Moreover, the UK birth certificate expressly
says that it is not a means of identification, and I have heard
a senior official from the Passport Office claim that this is
also the case for the UK passport. The fact that they are used
as such all the time just shows how confused the situation is
in the UK. This reflects, in part, the absence of either a UK
population register as exists in many European countries, or
an identity card system after the repeal of the 2006
Identification Card Act. The problems of birth registration
are thus only part of a much broader issue of identification in
a somewhat ramshackle common law system.
It is also interesting how far the authors and those they
champion have internalized the norms of the bureaucratic
state – hence, people seem to feel that they have been
‘living a lie’ because of the gender on their birth certificate.
But why should a bureaucratic act, and a piece of paper,
prevent people from creating their own narratives about
themselves? Much the same could be said, of course, of the
call for same-sex marriage. McCandless (2017) argues that
such conventional norms create problems for registration
reform. We could, of course, argue that being ‘norm-al’, or
ordinary, is exactly what the lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender community wants, but do we always need to see
ourselves through an official lens in this manner? This takes
us into the whole sociological theory of the internalization of
norms upon which society depends, the construction of
gender and the ethical anarchism of the likes of James C
Scott (2011), and can hardly be covered properly here.
It might be a relief to move away from such rarefied
issues to look at some of the detailed arguments raised in
these articles, especially that by Crawshaw et al. (2017).
They suggest that changes in the nature of registration must
preserve the privacy of the individual involved. This seems
possible in terms of information related to ‘non-traditional’
forms of procreation, but would seem to negate the purpose
of a person being able to change the record of their gender
and name in the registration system. Of course, there would
be no privacy from the state that holds this information,
which some would regard as no privacy at all. So, what is
‘privacy’? As David Vincent has recently argued so cogently,
for much of history, privacy was bound up with the notion of
‘An Englishman’s home is his castle’, which meant the
seclusion of the family space. This meant, of course, the
maintenance of patriarchy. This legal concept is even
appealed to by Warren and Brandeis at the end of their
classic text of 1890 on which the modern concept of
individual privacy rights are based (Vincent, 2016; Warren
and Brandeis, 1890). Are we really talking, therefore, about
the autonomy of an individual to choose their own narrative,
and to decide how far their ‘family space’ should extend?
Crawshaw et al. (2017) argue that any additional expense
involved in changes to the registration system should be
‘proportionate’, but do not define what that means in
practice. Their argument is somewhat circular in that ‘the
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indicates that any such resource requirements are propor-
tionate’. However, the cost involved would not be driven so
much by the number of cases involved, but the need to
revise the basic structure of the underlying database and
registration system. Also, the changed history of the
registration would need to be preserved in order to allow
the person to prove that ‘Alan’ before date X was ‘Alice’
after that date for official purposes, which increases
complexity within the system. Registration documents
would presumably be required for proving rights to employ-
ment under the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality
Act, including any changes of name.
The fact that the articles by Crawshaw et al. (2017) and
McCandless (2017) raise so many issues shows their impor-
tance, although from an historian’s perspective, they
perhaps raise more questions than answers. But, what is
wrong with that?
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